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Abstract
Literature on public and private firms has traditionally focused on the efficiency effects
of differing firm ownership, although the literature has been largely dormant since the 1980s.
State-led development models in Asia and Latin America warrant continued analysis of this
fundamental issue in International Political Economy. This paper attempts to frame debate on
natural resource governance by identifying the factors that affect the mix of public and private
firms in extractive industry. Historical institutionalism is used as a framework for analyzing
policy change, and political economy theory of governance institutions is compared to the
traditional economic theory of the firm. Analyzing the lithium industry in Chile and Bolivia as a
case study, this paper suggests that temporal factors like historical stability of economic
modeling and the sustained protection of property rights are critical in determining the optimum
mix of public and private firms. This paper synthesizes existing scholarly contributions with
original fieldwork gathered in the region.
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Introduction
The South American mineral wealth that financed the western world’s industrialization in
the 17th and 18th centuries left in its place misery and underdevelopment. Entire mountains in
the Andes are on the verge of collapsing, having been hollowed out by centuries of incessant
mining. From gold to guano, South America has seen its economic fortunes tied to the booms
and busts of natural resource exportation. More recently, the ownership of extractive industries
like mining and forestry has alternated between public and private with the changing ideological
tides of economic thought. Developmentalist states gave way to waves of neoliberal privatization
and now it seems poised to switch once more. The end of the Cold War helped the discourse
shed some ideological baggage and pragmatic policymakers across the world are attempting to
create their own models. Part of the reason for these shifts is that natural resource wealth has
repeatedly proven to impede the development of economic and political institutions more than it
helps them over recent history, embodied in resource curse discourse. A part of this reaction has
been a backlash against multinational corporations (MNCs), which account for the vast majority
of extractive economic activity worldwide, for their globalized structures and ability to influence
domestic politics. Resource sovereignty has reasserted itself in Latin America especially,
evidenced by popular leftist governments in Bolivia and Venezuela, among others. State-owned
enterprises (SOEs) are regaining stature in comparison to MNCs on ideological and practical
grounds.
Proper resource governance could minimize the effects of the resource curse and spur
development in areas of the world that have suffered the exploitation of colonialism and
imperialism for centuries. This paper seeks to understand what factors influence the optimal mix
of public and private firms in natural resource industries because of the vast development
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potential of resource wealth. I argue that the popular mainstream debate over the inherent
efficiencies of state versus privately owned firms is overly reductionist and misses the contextual
factors that actually matter: a state’s historical commitment to maintaining juridical security,
popular perceptions of MNCs, and the nature of government’s political base. This paper will
examine the lithium industries of Chile and Bolivia as case studies to show what factors
influenced the creation of two divergent models of ownership.
Property Rights Theory and Issues of Ownership
Economic theory provides a useful framework for examining public versus private firms.
Some approaches focus on ownership incentives and organization within firms; others focus on
aspects of market structure. Much of the defining literature on the subject was written during the
mid-1980s, reflecting the powerful tide of privatization/deregulation that also characterized
political debate at the time. The purely economic perspectives usually attempt to use econometric
modeling to compare public and private firms numerically and generally use efficiency as the
main, if not sole, measure of success. Indeed, theories of the firm are applied to a huge range of
pure economic issues. Although the narrow focus afforded by econometrics is less useful in more
inherently holistic political economy analysis, this literature inevitably serves to structure this
paper’s central question.
It is worth noting here that literature comparing public and private firms is very closely
tied with literature on privatization. This paper is focused on state-owned enterprise (SOE) and
private enterprise (PE) and does not attempt to understand privatized firms, which are presented
with unique ownership issues. Although some of the firms examined in the case studies had at
one time partial government ownership, they have been private for nearly 30 years now and for
almost the entire time they have been producing lithium, so they will be treated as if they have
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always been PEs. Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore many of the general theoretical considerations
of privatization literature that can be applied to firms that have always been private.
One perspective that focuses on firm ownership as key is the property rights theory of
the firm, which states that SOEs are inherently less efficient because of the attenuation of
property rights. Jensen and Meckling generalize this conclusion by stating that the behavior of all
individuals, including firm managers, depends fundamentally on the contracts that determine
one’s property rights.1 Because they are essentially immune to threats of takeover due to their
ownership, SOEs have fewer incentives to optimize management structures and inefficiency
results.2 The presence of a “takeover market” necessitates efficiency in management in order to
stay independent and in operation. SOEs are protected from takeover by their owner and
therefore can tolerate higher levels of inefficiency. According to Vining and Boardman, by the
1990s this school of thought had lost some theoretical traction since its inception in the 1960s,
though it remains supported empirically. Vining and Boardman compared the 500 largest nonU.S. industrial firms at the time and concluded that “large industrial MEs and SOEs perform
substantially worse than similar PCs.”3
Property rights theory has developed alongside theories of agency relationships, which
attempt to explain how contractual relationships between actors in firm management incur
agency costs. The concept of agency costs is a crucial element for literature on the separation of
ownership and control, which also applies to the public versus private debate. Fama and Jensen
conclude that management structures that separate risk bearers from decision makers lead to
problems of agency, although these are outweighed by benefits from specialization. With
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separation of ownership and control firms are able to choose managers that are best suited for
firm operation.4 Alchain had a similarly important contribution to this area of corporate
governance, arguing that SOEs run into monitoring problems as well because their degree of
ownership concentration is higher than any PE could be (all citizens could be considered owners
in a SOE).5
One significant challenge in any ownership-focused argument is to understand the
behavior of policymakers in SOEs. Understanding the objectives of public firms is one step
towards this goal. Whereas PEs are intrinsically profit-maximizers, SOEs also seek to maximize
sociopolitical goals like employment, regional diversification, and securing strategic reserves.6
Acceleration of technology transfer, reduced inequality, and facilitation of industrialization
through central planning are other social goals of SOEs set forth by Choksi.7 These goals are not
always clear, however, which presents another issue specifically for SOEs: the wide array of
possible state objectives are often not clearly stated and the possibility for electoral change
creates commitment problems. In their broad summary of privatization literature, Megginson and
Netter state that the inherent inability of governments to commit to stable policy reduces
operative efficiency. Furthermore, goals based on general socioeconomic welfare principles are
difficult to turn into effective policy and are often hard to measure.8 Although focusing on these
secondary goals generally leads to inefficiencies in a competitive market, market failures can be
corrected through state intervention via SOEs.
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Market Structure and Competition
Theories of market structure and competition are the contemporary response to the
ownership theories that dominated the last decades of the 20th century. In their seminal 2001
literature review, Shirley and Walsh outline this way of thinking in comparison to ownership
theory. Theories based on competition focus on incentive effects, which are increased in
competitive markets via threat of decreased market share, and information effects, which help
owners receive information regarding their costs and managerial performance.9 Yarrow, King,
Mairesse, and Melitz stress that it is not the ownership, but “the competitive and regulatory
environment that shapes the incentives of managers.”10 Kole and Mulherin’s 1997 analysis of
public and private firm performance after the Second World War came to a similar conclusion.
Megginson and Netter qualifies this assessment to cases where the state does not play an active
role in the firm’s operation, which is clearly a fairly large change.11
Empirical evidence seems to suggest that while the presence of competition can mitigate
the inefficiencies of public ownership, it generally does not outweigh them entirely. Shirley and
Walsh even outline how SOEs could be incentivized to anti-competitive behavior. The blame is
placed on politicians, who are supposedly unable to commit to fomenting competition. In fact,
situations of high competition that would be best for SOEs are actively avoided by politicians.12
Another important vein of market structure theory focuses on oligopolistic markets and
natural monopolies, where a public firm could help solve some market failure. Because of everincreasing returns to scale, natural monopolies are most efficient with one firm. This has been
the justification for state involvement in many developed countries, predominantly in the
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telecommunications industry. In developing nations, the justification for state involvement is
related more to general market failures. Shirley and Walsh believe the literature is flawed in
these instances by comparing state ownership with privatization only, instead of examining the
potential of regulating a private monopoly. The balance there is stated to depend on whether or
not contracts are complete. If they are, meaning that they “define all aspects of performance and
every possible eventuality,” then a difference should be minimal.13 Obviously, this is a high
standard unlikely to be met in the majority of cases.
Both of these competing theories of the firm help structure the debate on state versus
private-owned industry, though neither ownership nor market structure dominate the theoretical
discourse. Similarly, each one shows a disconnect between theory and the empirical data. That is
not to say that they are inherently flawed, but rather that, like many purely economic theories,
they simply cannot possibly integrate the multitude of variables that influence outcomes. Instead,
they enumerate key explanatory concepts like agency costs and takeover markets that help orient
the more qualitative, descriptive theories common in political economy literature.
Historical Institutionalism and Theories of Policy Change
Because the ownership of a resource industry is necessarily the result of a state economic
policy, understanding how states arrive at their policy outcomes yields powerful clues for
analysis. Like the tension between ownership and market structure, policy change literature
reflects a struggle for primacy between structure-driven and agency-driven approaches.
Structuralism focuses on the constraining effect of institutions on behavior, while agent driven
approaches focus on individual rationality. This duality is questioned somewhat by Hay and
Wincott, however, who call for reconciliation between the two forces as a way to overturn a
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popular emphasis on institutional inertia.14 Differing theories of institutionalism exist, varying
from sociological institutionalism to rational choice analysis.
Historical institutionalism is another theoretical means to explain policy change, focusing
on policy as a result of the way strategic choices by policymakers are influenced by institutional
environments and long-term conflicts between actors. The temporal aspect here is a crucial
differentiation. Instead of a “break point from equilibria, change is an outcome of concrete
historical processes,” according to Singh.15 Internal contradictions and tensions are inherent in
this model and the way they interact over time creates layers of policy. Similarly, Silva argues
that models of resource governance are better conceived as a bundle of industrial and social
policies than one coherent policy.16 New policy can either replace existing rules (institutional
displacement) or coexist with old rules (institutional layering). There are two other levels of
policy change besides specific policy instruments, however: overarching goals and techniques
used to obtain these goals. Change in policy orientation can take place on any or all of these
levels. Determining the primary medium for change allows one to examine ideational aspects of
institutional change as well as the more discrete material sources of change.17 As such, the
adoption of an economic model cannot be viewed as a single, distinct event, but rather as one
step in an ongoing process. This emphasizes the effects of historical trends and contextual details
over any specific aspects of a given policy. As Singh aptly puts it, “institutional change is not a
neat process nor are institutional designs coherent models.”18 Accordingly, models of resource
governance are not monolithic either, but reflect the internal tensions and struggles inherent in
policymaking processes.
14
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Historical institutionalism is useful for this paper because it structures the analysis of the
policy changes that shape resource industry. Understanding how and why current models of
industry evolved into their current state is a crucial step towards assessing the implications of
public and private firms because their viability is inevitably shaped by the political economy in
which they operate. This may seem like tautological, yet it is worth explaining. Silva points to a
mistaken conceptualization of political economic models as well-defined, consistent, and most
importantly, monolithic. Models of resource governance, like development models, are not
implemented in their final form: they are crafted gradually as a response to the historical
context.19 Since identifying what factors influence the formation of these models is the central
goal of this paper, the questions prompted through a historical institutionalist approach provide
another layer of analysis.
State Autonomy, Capacity, and the Challenges of Economic Regulation
Due to overlap between resource curse and development theories, political economy
theory offers substantial contributions to the subject of natural resource industry. Existing
literature identifies a number of factors that influence a state’s policymaking with regard to
extractive industries. That said, the variety of lenses and approaches encompassed in a label like
political economy literature warrants further even further differentiation.
At its most basic level the resource curse hypothesis shows high levels of resource
abundance correlates with stunted economic development. The discourse came into prominence
in the 1980s and has remained a staple political economy subject. Resource curse scholars
generally tie the resource curse to the type of political state and its institutions. In her review of a
diverse array of resource curse literature, Norman makes it abundantly clear that resource
abundance is not inherently problematic, but rather a factor that can exaggerate bad
19
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governance.20 Auty and Gelb are among those who conclude that a strong developmental state
can help resource abundant countries maintain economic growth through decisive central
planning.21 Economic rents, or “the surplus earned by factors of production over and above the
minimum earnings necessary to induce their employment,” are a pillar of the resource curse
hypothesis and resource governance in general. 22 Rents are important even when mining is
privatized because governments create the fiscal regime and legislation that magnitude and
sharing of rents.23 Government rents from extractive industries, generate political competition
that can lead to factional, predatory states that seek to strategically distribute rents in order to
stay in power, leading to incoherent and inefficient economic policy. Even a benevolent state that
seeks to maximize long-run social welfare faces pressure to overextend itself.24 The influx of
resource rents in an economy generally leads to relaxed market discipline that reduces
investment efficiency over time. By contrast, resource poor states cannot afford to overextend
themselves in support of inefficient endeavors or an expansive bureaucracy. Furthermore, the
lack of natural resources necessitates investment in human and social capital. Contributions to
the resource curse discourse are closely tied to discussions on models of natural resource
industry because they share the same basic governance issues.
Political autonomy is often identified as one of the key factors in policymaking regarding
economic policy. Auty and Gelb’s given solution to the resource curse is a developmental state
with sufficient autonomy to maintain a coherent economic policy over the long-term, an
argument that applies more generally to natural resource governance as well.25 Government
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autonomy refers to the degree of insulation of policymakers from societal demands. Without
some degree of autonomy, political competition among interest groups would lead to incoherent
economic policy. Politically popular but inefficient policies like public employment and import
protection are generally preferred in the short-term by social groups over education,
infrastructure and other forward-looking policies.26 As Przeworski and Limongi put it,
“democracy is always responsive to the pressures for immediate consumption.”27 Silva states that
state policymakers rarely benefit from absolute autonomy from social forces and are forced to
broker multiclass social coalitions in support of their policies to stay in power.28 The creation of
a meritocratic bureaucracy can lead to higher autonomy because policymakers are not elected,
but this approach brings concerns of inefficiencies and increased opportunities for corruption.
Political institutions are not the only factors affecting the autonomy of economic
policymaking; societal constraints also play a role. Haggard and Moon explain the limits of
institutional theories of national level policymaking and the influence that social groups can
possess. By relying on generalized, highly aggregate models of political regimes, institutional
theories lack the descriptive depth of societal approaches.29 Beyers and Kerremans focus on
competing social cleavages to examine how different interest groups mobilize to gain
government influence. In their 2004 study of EU politics, they conclude that social cleavages
between pro-environment groups and pro-growth groups prevent the development of an effective
technocracy. Beyers and Kerremans identify an issue’s potential for mobilizing broad public
support as the main factor in determining an interest groups ability to influence policy.30 Social
26
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issues surrounding extractive industries are renowned for their ability to mobilize the formation
of competing coalitions. Ballard and Banks see mining as an anthropological discourse that has
begun to incorporate new actors from a variety of backgrounds since the 1980s minerals boom
generated scholarly interest. What was once a conventional binary contest between states and
corporations has broadened to include representatives of local communities, environmental
advocates, and others. These coalitions are often unstable and centered on individual projects.31
The balance of competing social group constrains a state’s policymaking autonomy.
Autonomy is balanced by concerns for accountability, although they are not mutually
exclusive. In an interesting overlap with economic theory, Vernon explores the different devices
states use to balance concerns of autonomy and accountability. He concludes that states have
almost always attempted to separate SOEs from ordinary government ministries rather than fully
incorporate them into existing government structures, a direction usually leading to suboptimal
results.32 Transparency is a significant aspect of accountability and is especially important in
cases of decentralized resource governance. Transparency can also help mitigate the governance
concerns of SOEs because firms are less likely to deviate from stated goals and policies when
they are public. Accountability can stymie corruption and ensure that government’s most basic
mandate is fulfilled: to serve the needs of its constituents.
Government capacity is another key factor in natural resource governance, whether
public or private in. Where autonomy affects the state’s ability to choose policy, capacity refers
to the state’s ability to effectively implement chosen policy. Singh places capacity and autonomy
together as the most important determinants of governance, arguing that “it is state capacity and
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autonomy from societal forces, regardless of political ideology, which permit the state to take a
steering role in economic management, specifically through a relatively coherent policy network
for implementing state planning.”33 Economic management here can refer to state-led industry or
regulatory processes for private enterprise. State capacity is an obvious necessity for managing
and enforcing the royalty regimes affecting PEs in resource industry, as well as other regulatory
regimes like environmental agencies.
Privatization also emerged as a major political economy discourse in the 1980s when a
slew of resource abundant developing nations began reevaluating the ISI models that
predominated in post-colonial resource economies. Discussions of privatization trend towards
institutional analysis, focusing on the presence of regulatory institutions as a determinant of
success. Fishlow’s assessment of Latin American political economic transformation in the 1980s
reacts against the proliferation of literature proclaiming privatization as a panacea for
development issues.34
Big push theory also merits mentioning here because of its implications for development
through natural resource extraction. Big push reasoning is based upon the presence of lowincome equilibrium traps that prevent industrialization due to high fixed costs. Resource
industries present a viable solution to this dilemma by providing the initial capital flows
necessary to incentivize entrepreneurial activity in the early phases of industrialization.35
Without this initial impetus, developing nations do not have the resources to build the necessary
infrastructure. This is a counterpoint to resource curse models that emphasize diversifying
resource abundant developing economies away from the export of a handful of primary
commodities because it strongly doubts their ability to do so. Big push reasoning does not
33

Nem Singh J.T. "Reconstituting the Neostructuralist State” (2010): 1413-1433.
Fishlow, Albert. "The Latin American State." (1990) 70.
35
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner. "The Big Push, Natural Resource Booms and Growth.” (1999): 43-76.
34

Knape 13
explicitly favor a state-led or private-led approach as long as a significant portion of rents are
kept in the producing country to spur this transformation.
The location of the scholarly contributions discussed in the preceding pages is necessary
to note before moving on to case studies. In development literature, topics like natural resource
management and the role of the state in extractive industry were at their peak in the 1980s and
early 1990s and have since been largely ignored. This can partially be explained by the political
context, given the cold war’s penchant for transforming discourses to fit its own oppositional
nature. State-led approaches were juxtaposed with free-market capitalism on ideological grounds
as much as their development potential. It is also possible that natural resource management was
still a new topic for the many formerly colonial nations seeking to enter the world economy in
the quickest way possible. Cheap manufacturing by MNCs has arguably usurped the position of
resource extraction as the predominant development concern in poor countries. Either way, there
exists a notable lack of interest in the subject since the 1990s, which is problematic given the
changing nature of the international economy. I refer specifically to the relatively recent
emphasis on environmental and ethnic or regional issues. Environmentalism has reached a
threshold worldwide so that MNCs are forced to tailor their activities to face a globalized norm
or face retribution by consumer groups and government regulatory agencies. Likewise,
discussions of minority ethnic rights and regional autonomy have risen steadily since the end of
the cold war as nationalism gave way to the rise of regional and ethnic identities. Rarely can
states now endeavor independently to extract resources for the benefit of the nation; rather they
must balance the development demands of smaller communities and interest groups. This adds
another layer to the governance concerns already identified with resource industries.
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Methods
This paper contributes to a fundamental discourse in international political economy by
reconciling the established theoretical approaches mentioned previously with the analysis of two
case studies predominantly based on in-depth interviews. I conducted on-site, taped interviews
between June and August of 2011 on a research trip in Bolivia and Chile.36 Interviews were
conducted in English and Spanish.37 Subjects came from a wide array of backgrounds in the
lithium industry, ranging from bureaucrats in the Bolivian state-owned mining corporation
(COMIBOL) to economists with doctoral degrees from US universities. Due to the wide range of
backgrounds and perspectives being examined, interviews were semi-structured and did not
maintain a consistent structure. However, fieldwork focused on examining a basic set of issues:
how each nation’s political economy of lithium had developed, how the subject perceived the
current state of their respective nation’s lithium industry, and the prospects for future change. I
also took a guided tour of COMIBOL’s lithium pilot plant.
I chose to use primarily qualitative research methods for a mix of practical and strategic
reasons. The opaque nature of the lithium industry worldwide is one important constraint.
Although currently almost all lithium producers are publically-traded MNCs, market data
remains limited and hard to find. Transactions are made directly between producers and
consumers, not on a public commodities market like most minerals. Market estimates of supply
and demand are therefore difficult to find. Chilean government tax records are one of the ways to
get around this issue to examine sales and profits, but this is more difficult because lithium
represents less than 25% of total sales for its producers. Potassium and other chemical products
derived from brines have a much larger global market. The state-owned Bolivian enterprise is
36
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significantly less transparent and publishes little that could be used in quantitative analysis. The
relatively small size of the global lithium market is another factor contributing to the dearth of
public data.
Strategic considerations also steered me towards qualitative methods. Examining the
political economy of lithium in a region so laden with historical and cultural factors inevitably
leads to complexities better suited to more flexible, descriptive methods. I felt that limiting my
analysis to a number of factors manageable for econometric or other quantitative methods would
have been irresponsible. Fieldwork sought to make up for the lack of existing academic research
on global lithium industry.
This paper’s methodology presents serious limitations as well, however, as focusing on
qualitative methods often means foregoing the general applicability of numerical analysis. The
conclusions reached in this paper will be difficult to transfer to other specific cases due to the
large number of factors discussed. Other studies will require similarly rigorous fieldwork to
make use of these conclusions. Even so, the advantages of qualitative research methods remain
decisive.
Lithium Industries in Chile and Bolivia: Case Studies
The decision to examine the comparative development of Chile and Bolivia’s lithium
industries as case studies is a product of current and future conditions. Although lithium is a
relatively unknown industry at the moment, it has massive amounts of potential for growth given
its applications in energy storage. Lithium-ion battery packs are currently the standard in
portable electronics and appear to be the future of electric vehicles. The current market size is
estimated to be US $450 million and 25% of lithium is used in the production of batteries. Glass
and lubricants make up the other two largest market sections. The strategy of the Chilean MNC
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Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile (SQM) for lithium is focused on electric cars. They
estimate that as many as eighteen million cars could be using lithium-ion batteries by 2030.38
Other analysts estimate that sales of lithium car batteries could grow by 1000% in the next two
decades.39 Car batteries are not the only avenue for growth, as a vast array of electronics utilize
lithium ion batteries. Bolivian economist Juan Carlos Zuleta believes that lithium could be the
centerpiece of a “clean-tech paradigm” focused on environmental concerns and independence
from fossil fuels.40
This is not the first time experts have predicted a huge rise in lithium’s importance,
however, and the last time was severely overestimated. During the height of the hype on nuclear
energy in the 1970s, lithium was seen as a possible key component in fusion power. This led to
much of the geological surveys that first established lithium reserve levels in South America and
other political regulations that will be discussed later. Fusion power has not yet transitioned into
a viable technology some forty years later and it should give some pause to observers. Electric
powered cars also went through a boom in excitement during that time period and never
materialized on the mass market. Tech analysts freely admit that current lithium ion technology
is not yet ready to make the jump into an everyday consumer technology and that it requires
further investment towards lower production costs to reach the optimistic forecasts.41 This
growth potential raises the development stakes for states with deposits of the mineral. Like many
extractive resources with high value, lithium could spur meaningful economic development, or
decline a la the resource curse.
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The recent history of the region’s production of lithium also lends it to analysis. Unlike
more traditional natural resource industries like copper or tin, the contemporary nature of
lithium’s latest rise to importance means that its political economy is generally less established.
Chile has been producing industrial quantities of lithium for barely three decades and Bolivia has
yet to bring any quantity to market. Thus, I believe that their political economy is more “pure”
and contains less confounding variables than an industry like copper that has dominated the
region’s economies for centuries. This is not discounting the role of historical factors in the
creation of the respective nations’ development strategies, but rather that there exists less of the
embedded, institutional obstacles to change that are seen in industries with long histories. These
characteristics made lithium a compelling industry for case studies in natural resource
economics.
I chose Bolivia and Chile as comparative case studies because although they possess
relatively similar resources geologically, their strategies of developing lithium industries could
not be more different. Both nations produce lithium from brines under salt lakes in the Atacama
Desert of central South America and between them they account for 66% of world lithium
resources , according to the most recent estimates by the US Geological Survey (USGS).42 This
creates a control variable of sorts that allows for more focused analysis on the effects of different
forms of government involvement. Because their geographic qualities are similar, varying
outcomes of lithium industry must then be a result of political and economic factors.
The fact that Chile and Bolivia share some aspects of their cultural heritage and colonial
history is similarly important for analysis. Both nations were colonies under the Spanish empire
until the early 19th century and therefore originated with similar institutions. Though the legacy
of Spanish influence is perhaps less visible in Bolivia, the lithium-producing regions of both
42
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nations are inhabited by largely the same ethnic groups. The Aymara are an indigenous people
that have lived in the high Andean plateaus of South America since well before the Spanish
arrival. They maintain an ethnic majority in both the Potosí department of Bolivia and the
Chilean region of Antofagasta, which contain the nation’s lithium resources. Both Chile and
Bolivia are ethnically heterogeneous nations by region, which makes the locally concentrated
nature of the lithium industry more problematic. Questions over how to distribute control over
resources and the rents associated with that control are complicated when the populations around
production sites are primarily of one ethnic group, in this case the Aymara.
Each nation’s lithium reserves are similar but not equal. Simply put, extracting lithium is
significantly easier in Chile’s Salar de Atacama than in Bolivia’s Salar de Uyuni, despite the size
of overall reserves. Jaime Claros, a Bolivian chemical engineer at the Autonomous University of
Tomás Frías in Potosí, Bolivia, has been studying the Salar de Uyuni for over 20 years and
points to several key differences between the two sites: evaporation rates, relative concentrations
of lithium to other minerals in the brines, and seasonal precipitation levels.43 The standard
production process for lithium carbonate, which is the most common commercial form, requires
months of evaporation to reach acceptable concentrations. Lower evaporation rates in Bolivia
mean that this phase of the project takes three to five months longer than in Chile. Similarly,
southern Bolivia suffers from a nearly five month rainy season, which can flood the evaporation
pools and dilute the chemical solution. When I was in Uyuni, the entire Salar was flooded under
50 cm of rainwater. This complicated transportation around the facility and ongoing construction
efforts. To contrast, Chile’s Salar de Atacama is one of the driest places on earth. The ratio of
lithium to magnesium and other minerals is measurably different between the two sites as well.
In Chile the ratio of lithium to magnesium is between 1:6 and 1:8, in Bolivia it is between 1:18
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and 1:24.44 This makes the chemical extraction process less efficient and drives costs up. All of
these factors help make the Chilean industry more efficient and competitive.
The Current State of the Lithium Industry
Despite its potential for growth, lithium currently represents only a tiny fraction of
Chile’s GDP. Chile is currently the world’s largest lithium producer, accounting for some 4060% of world supply45, yet less than 1% of the nation’s GDP.46 Total production has varied
widely in the past decade due to unstable demand around the 2008 crisis but rose in 2010 and
that trend is expected to continue due to strong demand in Asia. SQM has an annual capacity of
40,000 metric tons and the German-owned MNC Chemetall SCL trails at 28,000 metric tons.47
Chilean production is entirely privatized, exclusive to SQM and SCL, the two MNCs
who enjoy special mandates from the central government thanks to a grandfather clause in
regulation. Chile followed a worldwide movement in the 1970s and designated its lithium
reserves to be strategic resources due to their use in processing nuclear fuel and potential for
nuclear fusion, which delegated stricter regulation to the state. The 1979 Decree Law Number
2886 limited the mining, processing, and trading of lithium compounds to the Chilean State or to
operating companies via special arrangement48.
The two MNCs that operate currently in Chile bought out concessions to mine lithium
from the state development agency CORFO. CORFO commissioned two independent projects in
the 1980s to explore the economic potential of the Atacama salt flats, the Lithium Project and the
Potassium Salts and Boric Acid Project.49 The contracts for both projects initiated as mixed
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enterprises between CORFO and private corporations. CORFO sold the two concessions
gradually during the nation’s privatization phase in the mid-1980s and the legislature has not yet
amended lithium’s status to allow further concessions to be allotted.
According to Jose Ascencio, a professor of mining at the University of Santiago, Chile,
the prospect of amending the legislation relating to lithium production is dim, despite its
antiquated restrictions.50 Nuclear applications of lithium reflect scientific knowledge from the
1970s and Chile still does not use nuclear power, although it has reinitiated talks with France and
US to move in that direction. The world is also no closer to viable fusion energy, which was one
of the driving forces behind the initial restrictions. Another obstacle in the way of liberalizing the
lithium market in Chile is the lack of data on reserves.51 The government has based its appraisals
on USGS surveys from the 1970s, information that must be updated before further concessioning
can take place.
The royalty regime affecting production is similarly dated and reflects the incoherent
nature of the concessions. SQM pays a combination of a fixed $150,000 annual rent and a 6.8%
of its lithium sales to the Chilean government. Since SCL’s contract was more focused on
general brine minerals, it pays 10% of magnesium sales and 3% of potassium chloride sales in
royalties. Both concessions limit production, although in different forms. The concession owned
by SCL expires in 2030 and has a maximum production limit of 180,000 tons of lithium metal,
which analysts predict will be fulfilled by 2023. SQM ‘s concession has not expiration year but
limits consumption to 200,000 tons of lithium metal. 52 As a whole, Chilean state income from
lithium taxes is tiny in scale.
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In contrast, Bolivia’s state-led approach has yet to bring any quantity of lithium to the
market. The project began in 2007 under the very public direction of President Morales. Morales
laid out a three phase plan for development in 2008 known as the “National Strategy for the
Bolivian Evaporate Resources Industrialization.” The plan calls for the construction of a pilot
plant with limited production capability in phase one, scaled up production of lithium and other
evaporate resources in phase two, and the development of value-added industries like batteries
and electric cars for phase three.53 Of the three phases, only the final one is open to foreign
investment. Evert Villena, the Director of External Relations and Communications in
COMIBOL’s evaporate division, maintains that Bolivia has the capability to develop the hightech industry independently and insists that the effort faces no major technological barriers.54
The extraction of lithium from the salt flats will be 100% state-owned and based on Bolivian
scientific efforts, which many argue are not up to international standards.55 Total investment for
the first two phases was initially targeted at over US $500 million, to be covered entirely by the
Bolivian central bank and treasury. The production of lithium carbonate is expected to
commence in the early months of 2012, more than a year behind schedule.56
Ensuring Property Rights and Historical Juridical Security
Historical factors, like the consistent maintenance and enforcement of economic policy
over time, are perhaps the most important factors affecting the formation of Bolivia and Chile’s
current lithium policy. Chile has maintained the same neoliberal economic model established in
the early 1970s with few changes, whereas Bolivia shifted from import-substitution
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industrialization (ISI) to liberalism and now back to a more statist model. It is important to note,
however, that neither Bolivia nor Chile are perfect examples of their respective economic
ideologies. CODELCO, Chile’s state owned copper corporation, still accounts for some 30% of
the nation’s copper production and hundreds of millions of dollars in yearly revenue for the
state.57 Bolivia similarly licenses out production of petroleum products, tin, and other minerals to
MNCs. These seemingly outlying policies underscore the historical institutionalist view of
development models as bundles of economic and industrial policy rather than totally coherent,
ideological creations. This is an important distinction because both Bolivia and Chile
consciously enacted policy specific to the evaporate resources. As historical institutionalism
posits, policymakers did not simply apply industrial policy wholesale to the entire economy.
Thus, it warrants analysis of why Chile chose to regulate an entirely private industry when
Bolivia has stuck to its state owned plans.
Chile adopted its current economic model during the military government of Augustus
Pinochet, who brought in US-trained economists famously known as the “Chicago Boys” to
implement a market-oriented economic model. By the early 1980s the Chilean government had
sold off the majority of the firms nationalized under the previous government of socialist
Salvadore Allende and was rapidly pursuing bilateral FTA’s and other liberalizing measures.
When the Pinochet government was voted out in 1988, the new left-leaning coalition government
opted to continue the neoliberal model. Chilean economic policy has largely stayed the same
since 1973. This fits with the conclusions that Przeworski and Limongi noted earlier on
“developmentalist” dictatorships.58
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Bolivia pursued fully three separate economic models in the same time frame, beginning
with fully three decades of ISI following the 1952 revolution. 59 Bolivia ran into the same debt
problems as its neighbors in the early 1980s, however, and the 1985 elections ushered in the
liberal New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP shared much in common with Chile’s neoliberal
model, including its origins. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, mentioned earlier for his
contributions to big push theory, was instrumental in developing the model. Sachs worked
closely with the new government in order to shift towards an outward-oriented economy with
liberalized domestic markets and a minimal state.60 This phase of Bolivia economic history
lasted until the 2005 election of Morales and his Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party. By
2004, only 11 percent of Bolivians believed in the merits of a liberal market-driven economy.61
Morales worked quickly to nationalize the natural gas industry and public utilities which were
privatized under the NEP. Morales refers to the current economic model as “communitarian
socialism” and eschews neoliberalism as a form of imperialism.
Regardless of the effects of any one model, the development benefits of ensuring private
property rights through consistent economic policy cannot be overemphasized. Natural resource
industries are massively capital intensive, requiring huge initial investment that sometimes is not
recouped for decades. If the industrialization is driven by the private sector like in Chile,
nationalization, or simply the threat of it, leaves a lasting impression. Infrastructure, technology,
capacitation of labor all take time and investment to develop. In developing nations that lack
state financing for large infrastructure projects, MNCs bear a greater share of these costs in order
to operate. Three decades of consistent economic policy have made Chile one of the best
business environments in Latin America. Investors know what to expect and trust that their
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property rights and contracts will be protected. The private sector is wary of Bolivia because of
its tumultuous past. Doing Business, a project of the World Bank, encapsulated these differences
in its 2010 rankings. Out of 183 countries included, Chile was the 39th most business friendly,
while Bolivia was 153rd.62 Any discussion of changing royalty regimes has been staunched by
policymakers worried about scaring off foreign investors. When then-President Ricardo Lagos
tried to introduce a royalty charge based on sales in 2004, politicians balked at the thought. José
Piñera, a co-author of Chile’s defining 1980 Mining Law, modestly states that his legislation was
the “key to riches” because it “sent a message to domestic and foreign investors from that
moment that private property was fully guaranteed in Chile.”63
While this argument applies more directly to private industry, the nature of the world
economy means that even a state-owned approach must interact with private sector actors. In
Bolivia, COMIBOL is in the process of finding investors to help develop its lithium industry and
is running up against these issues. According to Rolando Jordan, a Bolivian mining economist,
the Bolivian government is in a very weak negotiating position with MNCs because it must start
from scratch each time it alters policy.64 For private sector actors already spooked by Morales’
rhetoric on MNCs, negotiating partnerships becomes a very risky affair. Risk lowers businesses
rate of return and causes them to negotiate more strictly at the state’s expense.
Levels of industrial infrastructure and development have also played roles in the
formation of the lithium industry in Chile and Bolivia. Andrés Yaksic, SQM’s Marketing Manager
for lithium products, said it was impossible to ignore the benefits of Chile’s mineral history. Thanks to
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infrastructure were established in northern Chile’s Antofagasta region, which also possesses the
nation’s lithium resources. 65 Bolivia also has a long mining history, but not of the modern
industrial sort seen in Chile. CODELCO alone exports some 1.8 million tons of copper yearly.66
For a smaller industry like lithium, Chilean producers benefit from more than adequate
infrastructure. To contrast, Uyuni, the closest town to the Bolivian pilot plant and provincial
headquarters for COMIBOL, has only benefitted from consistent electricity in the past decade.
Yaksic, Zuleta, and Villena all acknowledged existing infrastructure as one of the most important
differences in cost between the two nations.67
The legacy of colonialism is the other major historical factor affecting Bolivian and
Chilean economic policymaking. Until their independence movements in the early 19th century,
the two countries experienced essentially the same colonial experience. As their colonial power,
Spain used natural resources extracted from Bolivia and Chile to finance its imperial ambitions.68
The most famous example of this exploitation is Bolivia’s Cerro Rico, an incredible silver
deposit located less than 100 miles from the Uyuni salt flat. Both Bolivia and Chile have
remained primary commodity exporting economies long after formal independence. Bolivian
economist Milton Lerida believes that Bolivia is worse off in today’s capitalist economic
structure than during its colonial period because the scale of extractive mining is so much
larger.69 Indeed, one could argue that the difference in the two nations’ reaction to prior
exploitation is more due to current economic status and political posturing by the Morales
government than differences during colonial times. It is hard to argue that Bolivia had a
substantially worse colonial experience, yet the narrative remains much more prominent in
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Bolivian policymaking. Ethnicity has also played a part in the development of the discourse. The
narrative of white European exploitation of indigenous populations, whether justified or not, is
influential. Dennis points to the Bolivian government’s use of buzzwords like dignity and
sovereignty in describing the project as a means to drum up nationalist sentiment.70 Interviews
conducted with Bolivian actors revealed that a liberal, privatized lithium industry is not even
considered a possibility due to past exploitation by colonial powers.
The role of Washington Consensus actors in Bolivia’s failed privatization movements
during the 1980 and 1990s also contributed to the public’s borderline xenophobic perception of
foreign capital. The influence of international institutions grew during the tumultuous two
decades prior, which led Burke and Malloy to coin the term national corporatism. Although
national corporatism’s roots were populist and therefore rhetorically nationalistic, the era’s
political elites consolidated power with support from the only stable source: western capitalist
powers.71 According to Hollender and Shultz, more than 250 state employees were
simultaneously on the payroll of the institutions like the World Bank and USAID during the mid1980s.72 This influence spurred on structural reforms from the IMF and the World Bank, which
exacerbated already poor living conditions and were seen as another form of North American
imperialism.73 Drastic drops in government revenues due to the privatization of petroleum,
natural gas, and water extraction were accompanied by lower social spending, increased foreign
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borrowing, and raised taxes. The IMF’s push for higher taxes in 2003 led to violent protests that
left 34 people dead.74
Duopolistic Competition in the Lithium Market
One of the underlying assumptions of economic theory regarding the efficiency of private
firms and free markets is the existence of competitive markets. The lithium industry has a
number of defining characteristics that make it markedly uncompetitive in this sense. The global
lithium market is a duopoly thanks to SCL and SQM’s dominant market share.75 The two firms
accounted for 70% of lithium produced from brines in 2010, or some 40,000 tons of lithium
carbonate.76 Furthermore, production in Chile, Argentina, and Australia account for 82% of total
lithium carbonate on the market. 77
Duopolistic production has a number of consequences for market access and firm
behavior because SCL and SQM have such considerable market power. Ruttinger and Feil point
to three possible negative consequences of the current lithium market structure: ruinous
competition, collusion, and supply disruptions due to geographically concentrated production in
a geologically unstable area.78 SQM demonstrated its market power in 2009 by lowering its
lithium prices by 20%, widely viewed as a move targeted towards emerging producers under the
auspices of controlling oversupply.79 The firm identified 14 projects worldwide currently in
development phase.80 Chilean producers are thought to have the lowest costs of any and are
producing at just over half of their capacity, which gives them further market power to adapt to a
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changing market.81 The ability of Chilean firms alone to handle the predicted demand spikes due
to electric vehicles depends on who you talk to. Yaksic is confident that SQM and SCL will be
able to meet global demand at least through 2020 before adding capacity.82 Zuleta believes water
shortages in the region will limit their ability to increase production on the level necessary.83
For the Bolivian project which is already at least a year behind schedule, the duopoly of
Chilean producers presents a major obstacle that is exacerbated by the closed nature of lithium
markets. Because lithium is not a publically traded commodity like many mineral resources,
existing client-producer relationships are even more important. As Asencio puts it, “this is not a
free market; this is more like a client-producer relationship. It is more direct. The price is not tied
to other conditions; a producer can drive prices and control them more.“84 In a perfectly
competitive commodity market it would not matter if Bolivia’s production was viewed as
unreliable due to political concerns about public ownership. Unfortunately for Bolivian
prospects, continuing with the established Chilean firms makes more sense in a duopolistic
producer-client structured market.
Political Trends and Leadership Problems
The presence of national populist movements in Bolivia presents further difficulties for
developing a public industry. This conclusion is strongly supported empirically by interviews as
well as existing scholarly analysis. MAS came to power in 2005 with the backing of rural coca
farmers, the urban poor, and indigenous ethnic communities and by many accounts has struggled
to maintain autonomy from social groups in economic policymaking. Bolivia’s ever-present
nepotism has grown to a point that Morales acknowledged in 2009 that corruption and
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bureaucratic ineffectiveness were the most serious challenges facing his second term as
president. Bolivia was 120th out of 180 countries for public-sector corruption in Transparency
International’s 2010 rankings.85 Part of this is due to a ballooning public sector funded by
natural gas revenues, but the diverse makeup of the ruling coalition also lends itself to nepotism.
The state-owned natural gas and oil corporation (YPFB) is itself the site of frequent accusations
of corruption.86 The nature of multiparty political competition also feeds patronage, as public
employment is used to ensure cooperation. As such, the majority of management personnel in
executive ministries end up being political appointees instead of meritocratic hires.87 As theory
predicts, individual interests have led to suboptimal policymaking.
Leadership and management concerns, usually due to nepotism, were voiced in all of my
Bolivian interviews. The massive logistical and technological expertise inherent in a project of
this magnitude necessitates utilizing the best talent available. The management inefficiencies
presented in theories of the firm appear to be fully present in Bolivia. Zuleta pointed specifically
to lack of a clear organizational structure and confusion over responsibility.88 Hollender and
Shultz explain how decision-making regarding lithium must travel between a myriad assortment
of government ministries and committees, each vying for increased power and influence.89
Reynaldo Cuadros, a member of the Bolivian Socialist Party in the provincial legislature and
former Ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), identified a lack of formal
education as a key cause of governance problems.90 For example, President Morales never
graduated from secondary school.
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The exclusion and alienation of leading scientific figures is another symptom of the
management deficiencies facing the Bolivian lithium industry. Bolivian petrochemical engineer
Saul Escalera knows firsthand how complicated Bolivia’s public sector work can be. In 2006
Escalera was appointed by Morales to be YPFB’s Director of Industrialization, specifically
charged with developing domestic industries related to petrochemical derivatives. Escalera, who
holds two patents for petrochemical refinement processes, resigned from his post in 2009 and
published a scathing reprisal of the Morales government’s management of the state-owned
corporation. Escalera bemoans the politically-motivated leadership purges that led to six
company presidents in three years, the inability of management to think outside the box and take
risks, and the priority of political concerns over the company’s administration and market
position. His central concern, however, is the lack of technical expertise on the part of political
appointees.91 Escalera recounted how his best engineering students that went to work for the
state ended up doing manual labor instead of advanced science because of their lack of political
connections. He remains an outspoken proponent of state ownership despite the disappointing
behavior of the current government: a common position among Bolivian academics.92 Hollander
and Shultz ran into similar stories in their research, commenting that “Bolivian experts with
decades of experience in evaporitic resources complain that they have been intentionally
excluded from the project due to political differences.”93 COMIBOL representatives point to a
scientific advisory committee that is supposed to offer technical consulting to the project as
evidence that participation is encouraged, but as the committee offers no financial compensation
it is not a terribly realistic option for academics with advanced degrees. Considering that there
already exists a fierce debate over whether or not any Bolivians have sufficient knowledge to
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successfully industrialize lithium production independently, the inefficient use of expertise due
to political concerns is a significant failure. Again, these failures are not inherent in Bolivia’s
state-owned approach, but due to the nepotistic pressures facing a populist government.
By comparison, the private Chilean firms are relatively independent from political
pressures. They face the same management concerns of any MNC, but have complete autonomy
in management affairs. It is ironic, however, that SQM’s entry into lithium market was a clear
case of nepotism and political influence. The current Chairman of the board of directors is Julio
Ponce, son-in-law of Pinochet. Ponce headed the privatization process of CORFO in the early
1980s when it owned the lithium concessions before buying SQM from the government in 1988
for what a government investigation later said was less than a third of its market price.94 Ponce
has headed the majority stakeholding group in SQM since that time.
The key difference between this example of corruption and what is currently happening
in Bolivia is the established nature of Chilean technocracy at the time. Chilean technocrats like
Ponce were college educated and had experience running private enterprise before entering the
public sector following the military coup in 1973. As was true for the Pinochet regime in general,
the technocrats economic successes came at the expense of income equality as the state reduced
social expenditures during privatization. Copper is once again a confounding variable, however,
and a poignant counter-narrative to Pinochet’s neoliberal ideology.95 The Pinochet regime
continued the nationalization process initiated under deposed socialist president Salvadore
Allende and would receive anywhere from 10-25% of yearly government revenue from copper
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sales, depending on commodity prices.96 In Bolivia currently, Morales’ MAS party is replacing
the existing bureaucracy with his primary support base: rural indigenous farmers.97 While
Morales’ other efforts to combat income inequality and embedded racism against indigenous
Bolivians have been widely lauded, the appointment of inexperienced, uneducated party
members to bureaucratic positions has led to predictable management failures.
Decentralization and Regional Involvement
Distribution of policymaking responsibility between central and regional political
institutions plays a large role in determining the development implications of the lithium
industry. Like most extractive industries, lithium is geographically concentrated in both nations.
In both cases, lithium production is centered in some of the most developmentally challenged
regions. Chile has always been a unitary state, while Bolivia has become increasingly
decentralized politically under the MAS government. All mining legislation and regulation in
Chile must pass through the national congress in the capital, regardless of its impact on region
where the activity actually takes place. It follows that decentralized resource governance has a
better chance of capturing economic benefits for the regions affected by the environmental costs
of economic activity. Andersson et al explain that decentralized resource policies come
predominantly in two forms, one seeking to devolve property rights to local communities, the
other seeking to allocate formal powers to subunits of the government. According to Andersson
et al, the form of decentralization changes incentives for local actors and that determines how
successful efforts are. 98
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The Potosí province of Bolivia has the nation’s highest poverty rate and about 46 percent
of the local population works in agriculture and livestock.99 Although the Chilean region of
Antofagasta has the infrastructure in place for the mineral mining industries, it also lacks
employment and trained labor. The direct impact of the lithium industry on other economic
activity is unfortunately minimal, as there are few linkages to other economic activity. This is
due to the rather unique nature of evaporative mining, which needs relatively small amounts of
labor and minimal skilled labor. This leads to a crucial question: how to best distribute the rents
associated with the lithium industry. While these two regions would clearly benefit from further
development, there are doubts about the ability of local government’s ability efficiently use
resources.100 Lerida, who lives in Uyuni, believes the provincial government of Daniel Campos
technically owns the rights to the lithium resources and should use rents to start a university
cluster that could further the development potential of the resource for local residents, not the
government in the capital. Lerida’s position is closely tied to his own ancestry in the region; he
calls the salt flat by its Aymaran name Tunupa instead of Uyuni and scorns what he sees as short
term thinking by the central government. Such an important opportunity needs to be viewed in
terms of centuries or millennia, not decades, according to Lerida.101
Transparency and accountability are necessary components of decentralized resource
policy as responsibility is shuffled around. Andersson et al assert that these approaches need
institutions that tie local politicians closely to their constituents.102 Zuleta emphasizes the role of
what he calls “social control” of the government’s effort, essentially accountability to make sure
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the project is meeting its targets and following through on policy.103 In this instance,
accountability and transparency are less about autonomy and more about minimizing the lack of
incentives caused by separated ownership and control. Hollender and Shultz expands the role of
transparency and ties it to the success of the entire Bolivian effort. They call for tripartite
transparency of formal oversight by political institutions, distribution of information by the
media, and an informed citizenry.104
Localization of Environmental and Social Impacts
The limited geographic scope of lithium mining means that the social and environmental
implications are concentrated in specific populations. The environmental effects of lithium
mining have not been rigorously discussed, yet the Chilean industry seems to indicate serious
externalities. Water consumption will be the most pressing concern in the short term, especially
in the Chilean Atacama desert. According to Zuleta, producing two liters of lithium brine to
evaporate requires 98 liters of fresh water.105 Refining processes drain the limited water supply
further and have potential for contaminating aquifers. Lerida and Claros allege that the Chilean
industry is drilling diagonally under the border and illegally siphoning water from Bolivia to
meet its need, an allegation that has not been discussed in the press.106 Dennis indicates that
draught in the region has already caused some local farmers to abandon their efforts.107 Concerns
over water scarcity are amplified because the water reserves in the region are classified as nonrenewable due to the low rainfall.108 Hollender and Shultz cite more dire reports that community
wells have dried up in recent years, although the nearby San Cristobal silver and zinc mine also
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plays a large role in local water consumption. Local backlash against the project, which is owned
and operated by a Japanese MNC, led to violent protests in April of 2010. Furthermore,
Hollender and Shutlz point to the Chilean and Argentinian lithium industries to demonstrate the
possibility for toxic contamination.109
The environmental impacts of the lithium industry have resounding social effects as well
given the dependency of local Bolivian populations on agriculture and tourism.110 Tourism
provides a living for 23% of the local population and visits to Uyuni are rising.111 This
adolescent industry depends on the natural beauty of the salt flats and may be decimated by large
scale industrial activity. Chilean production has led to massive piles of mineral tailings and
hundreds of square kilometers of artificial ponds and piping. Lerida recognizes the importance of
maintaining a balance between industry and tourism in order to the help the region avoid
becoming over dependent on any one industry.112 Seasonal tourism industries are certainly not
the most stable forms of employment, but the loss of tourism would be devastating to the
surrounding communities.
Conclusion
Examining Bolivian and Chilean lithium industries as case studies, the optimal mix of
public and private firms in natural resource economies is determined more by historical and
political factors than economic theory would suggest. The defining factor in the development of
each industry has been historical political trends, while political transparency appears to be the
most key to advancing development goals. The lithium industry presents a unique opportunity
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for Bolivia to independently exploit a natural resource from the beginning, whereas lithium
remains relatively insignificant to Chilean development in comparison to copper. Moving
forward, the development of a state-owned lithium industry in Bolivia faces a number of difficult
obstacles, particularly maintaining a necessary degree of autonomy from political influence.
The case studies showed that political economic theory and historical institutionalism
provide the most nuanced analytical tools, whereas different versions of firm theory prove more
useful as theoretical structures than empirical tools. Application of the arguments presented here
to other cases is more difficult because of the quantitative approach adopted, however. Perhaps
the most useful lesson is that issues of general economic efficiency are not the defining factors
affecting a state’s development of natural resource policy and that they more often are
misrepresented with ideological justifications. The role of the state cannot be reduced to the all
or nothing ideologies that predominated during the Cold War.
Rising income inequality throughout Latin America and the rest of the world lend a new
sense of urgency to the debate. Efficient state ownership of extractive industries would be a
powerful tool in helping to level the playing proverbial playing field and reallocate wealth, if it
can be done successfully that is. Likewise, the impact of environmental degradation is growing
as global consumption continues to rise and resource stocks begin to dwindle. Are states
inherently more environmentally conscious producers or are they better suited to regulating the
private sector? Given the right conditions, state ownership of natural resource industries offers
potential remedies for these important global issues as well as basic welfare-enhancing
development goals.
There exists significant potential for further study of public and private firms in
extractive industries because of the aforementioned lack of scholarly focus since the 1980s and
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the renewed willingness of state’s to consider state-led development. Draibe and Riesco discuss
the advent of a new development strategy emerging in Latin America, repositioning the state
once more as a leading strategic and regulatory actor alongside modern civil society.113 The
prevalence of state-led natural resource extraction in China presents another interesting case
study. Indeed, some of the interviewees for this paper mentioned China as evidence of a new
model of statist industrialization.
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